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Abstract
This paper assesses the accuracy of individuals’ expectations of their ﬁnancial
circumstances, as reported in the British Household Panel Survey, as predictors
of outcomes and identiﬁes what factors inﬂuence their reliability. As the data are
qualitative bivariate ordered probit models, appropriately identiﬁed, are estimated
to draw out the diﬀerential eﬀect of information on expectations and realisations.
Rationality is then tested and we seek to explain deviations of realisations from
expectations at a micro-economic level, possibly with reference to macroeconomic
shocks. A bivariate regime-switching ordered probit model, distinguishing between
states of rationality and irrationality, is then estimated to identify whether indi-
vidual characteristics aﬀect the probability of an individual using some alternative
model to rationality to form their expectations.
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11 Introduction
Despite the importance of expectations to macroeconomic behaviour, and their central
role in economic models, there has been little empirical work, as Carroll (2003) explains,
modelling individuals’ expectations. This has made it diﬃcult to understand expectation
formation and to come to an informed view about the informational value of expecta-
tional or consumer conﬁdence data. In part the paucity of direct data on individuals’
expectations is responsible.1 When collected, data often derive from cross-sectional sur-
veys and it is impossible to monitor either how the views of particular respondents are
changing over time or how they relate to actual economic experience. In addition, often
the results of the surveys are qualitative and are published only as aggregated variables -
typically as the proportion of optimists less pessimists, the so-called balance of opinion.
But recently there has been an increased eﬀort both to exploit available micro panel data
sets and then study them with a view to understanding expectations and in particular
expectational errors. This paper seeks to contribute to this small but growing literature
which includes Souleles (2004), with an application to the Michigan Index of Consumer
Sentiment. Related studies include Das & van Soest (1997) and Das & van Soest (1999)
with applications using Dutch data and, most closely related to this paper, Brown &
Taylor (2006) who studied British data. These studies, like ours, focus on expectations
or forecasts of individual speciﬁc, rather than aggregate, variables. Crucially they exploit
the panel aspect of the surveys to identify individual-level forecast errors from consecutive
or matched surveys.
Speciﬁcally we provide a detailed empirical investigation into the formation and re-
liability of individual-level expectational data in Britain. Our data source is the British
Household Panel Survey (BHPS) from 1991 to 2003 which is a nationally representative
sample of more than 5000 households, comprising about 10,000 individual interviews.
The BHPS asks individuals a range of questions including ones about the state of their
household’s ﬁnances this year and their expectations for next year. Responses to these
two questions are ordered and categorical as they reply “improve”, “stay the same” or
“worsen”. The relationship between these answers in successive years, capturing an in-
dividual’s expectational error, forms the basis of our study. Unlike the Michigan Index
1As Carroll notes there are in fact long established data sets of expectations in the US such as the
Michigan survey, the Survey of Professional Forecastsers and the Conference Board. For the UK, the focus
of our empirical work, there are less sources particularly surveying more than a few dozen individuals
or ﬁrms. For a review of survey expectations and their role in understanding expectation formation see
Pesaran & Weale (2006).
2of Consumer Sentiment, which provides at best just one forecast error per individual (cf.
Souleles (2004)), the BHPS provides multiple forecast errors per individual.
We then seek to extend our understanding of the informational content of expecta-
tional data by identifying those factors which inﬂuence their reliability. This is achieved
by drawing out the diﬀerential eﬀect of information on expectations and realisations. We
suggest the use of bivariate ordered probit models, appropriately identiﬁed, to identify
those factors which determine consumers’ expectations and the subsequent realisations.
We explain how the models facilitate both testing rationality and understanding devia-
tions of realisations from expectations at a micro-economic level, possibly with reference
to macroeconomic shocks. In contrast previous work has relied on single equation models;
see Das & van Soest (1999) and Souleles (2004).2 These do not draw out the diﬀerential
eﬀect of information on expectations and realisations. In addition they do not accom-
modate the ordered nature of both expectational and realisation responses; they assume
a single latent continuous random variable underlies the error rather than letting the
error simply be the diﬀerence between two latent continuous random variables represent-
ing expected and realised income changes. Other work has extracted (latent) regression
coeﬃcients from the polychoric correlation matrix separately estimated for consecutive
waves from the panel; see Horvath et al. (1992), Ivaldi (1992) and Nerlove & Schuermann
(1995).3 Accordingly this method tests for rationality contingent on the assumption of no
macroeconomic shocks.4
We thereby determine whether individuals use information eﬃciently when forming
their expectations and thus test whether expectational errors were rational ex ante. This
is important since expectations can be rational ex ante but not look rational ex post,
since macroeconomic shocks, for example, can cause a bias between expectations and the
subsequent realisation. Ex post we then try to explain how and why individuals make
2Brown & Taylor (2006) also employ single equation methods although the form of their model is
diﬀerent. They seek to explain realisations (dependent variable) with respect to expectations (indepen-
dent variable). In one speciﬁcation like us they allow expectations to be endogenous. But, as explained
below, this is achieved using generated expectational values and is therefore likely, in contrast to our
simultaneous method, to suﬀer from generated variable bias. Their other method assumes expectations
are exogenous. More worringly in this case expectations are considered as an index with 0 denoting down,
1 the same and 2 better. Clearly this model is not identiﬁed up to scale.
3This methodology can be seen as a special case of two-stage, structural equation modelling, estimators
more commonly employed in psychometrics; see Lee et al. (1992) and Moustaki (2001).
4Nonparametric rationality tests, again implicitly assuming no macroeconomic shocks, have also been
developed; see Gourieroux & Pradel (1986). As indicated other tests of the reliability of expectational
data have transformed the underlying micro-level responses, the focus of this paper, into aggregate (or at
best sectoral) quantitative variables using some quantiﬁcation method typically based on the proportions
of optimists and pessimists and then tested rationality; e.g. see Lee (1994).
3expectational errors; we investigate whether macroeconomic shocks occurring after the
expectation was formed help to explain expectational errors. This overcomes problems
previous work has had identifying whether deviations of expectations from realisations
are failures of rationality or are explicable by common shocks hitting households after
they made the forecast.
In common with much previous work [see Horvath et al. (1992); Das & van Soest
(1999) and Nerlove & Schuermann (1995)], including work using the BHPS [see Brown &
Taylor (2006)] we ﬁnd rationality is rejected for the sample as a whole. Recent work has
explained rejection of the rational expectations hypothesis in terms of the costs of forming
rational expectations exceeding the beneﬁts; e.g. see Carroll (2003) and Branch (2004).
It can be optimal to form expectations using some alternative to rational expectations
when there are costs to gathering information and forming rational expectations. To-date
focus has been on identifying this alternative model of expectation formation. Our focus
is slightly diﬀerent. We exploit the broad array of information the BHPS contains on
individuals’ characteristics to identify statistically the characteristics of individuals for
whom the costs of forming rational expectations apparently exceed the beneﬁts. This is
achieved using a bivariate regime-switching ordered probit model, distinguishing between
states of rationality and irrationality. In particular we examine whether age and other
background variables aﬀect the probability of an individual using some alternative model
to rationality to form their expectations. Given that we aim to establish stylised facts
about the sort of people who are likely to form expectations using some alternative to
rational expectations, the alternative model does not need to be speciﬁed structurally.
Future work should distinguish between alternative explanations for irrational behaviour,
perhaps by introducing additional states which distinguish between diﬀerent models of
expectation formation.
The plan of this paper is as follows. Section 2 introduces the BHPS. Given the categor-
ical nature of the observed expectational data, Section 3 motivates the consideration of a
continuous latent variable underlying the categorical responses as the preferred means of
modelling these data. Respecting the categorical nature of the survey data, Section 4 then
provides some descriptive statistics on expectations, including consideration of their reli-
ability. Section 5 suggests the use of bivariate ordered probit models to examine formally
the relationship between expectations and realisations. Section 6 explains how this model
provides a ready means to test rationality. Section 7 details the modelling results. Section
8 then suggests the use of and then estimates a regime-switching bivariate probit model
to identify what factors inﬂuence the probability of being rational. Section 9 concludes.
42 The BHPS: Data Description
The BHPS has been conducted since 1991 collecting nationally representative data annu-
ally from a panel of originally ﬁve thousand households comprising about ten thousand
individuals. The same individuals have been re-interviewed in successive years and if
they form a new household, all adults in the new household are thereafter included in the
survey. The data collected include information on the incomes of individual members of
the households and a wide range of socioeconomic data such as age, sex and educational
background. We consider thirteen waves of the BHPS, covering the years 1991 to 2003.
This covers a period of recession and recovery.
Of central concern are the responses the BHPS provides to the questions: “Has your
ﬁnancial position improved, stayed the same or worsened over the past year?” and “How
do you expect your ﬁnancial position to change over the coming year?” with the second
question inviting the same categorical answers.
The actual wording of these questions in the BHPS is not speciﬁed clearly enough
to be sure they are referring to income growth.5 But, to interpret the diﬀerence between
the retrospective and lagged prospective questions as a forecasting error, we do assume
respondents have the same concept in mind when replying to each question. These data
have been used as explanatory variables when seeking to explain consumption, income
and savings behaviour (see Guariglia (2001) and Guariglia & Rossi (2002)) but have been
largely ignored as a source of information in their own right.
The BHPS starts interviews in a given year in September. The majority of interviews
are completed by the end of December although some interviewing continues through to
the end of April. Matching the expectational and realisation data reduces the time-series
dimension of the panel at our disposal from 13 to 12 years. Moreover, in the econometric
work we exploit data the BHPS has on the change in households’ objective incomes. This
further reduces the time dimension, to 11 years. For consistency throughout we restrict
attention to these 11 years, but note that the descriptive statistics given below are little
aﬀected when the 12 year window is considered.
While the BHPS, as an annual survey, cannot capture rapid shifts in expectations
5There is, however, a statistically signiﬁcant and positive correlation between individuals’ ﬁnancial
position and income growth in their household (adjusted for household size using an equivalence scale);
information on households’ income is also provided in the BHPS. The polyserial correlation (Olsson et al.
(1982)) between the retrospective ﬁnancial position question (which is qualitative) and objective income
growth (as reported quantitatively) pooled across individuals and time has a t-value of 17.31. This drops
to 9.54 for the expectational ﬁnancial position question.
5which less complete but more frequent consumer surveys might capture it has the advan-
tage of supplementing direct observations on individuals’ expectations and realisations
with direct observations on the contents of individuals’ information sets, such as their
incomes and socioeconomic background. In contrast previous micro-level studies into the
nature of expectation formation in the UK have relied on data-sets like the Confederation
of British Industry’s survey of around 1000 ﬁrms each quarter; see Horvath et al. (1992)
and Nerlove & Schuermann (1995). While this survey does provide, albeit unpublished,
micro-level qualitative expectational and realisation data, little is known, certainly in a
quantitative form, about the contents of ﬁrms’ information sets, such as their income
(turnover) and proﬁts. This has prevented analysis moving beyond tests of rationality, or
speciﬁc alternatives such as naive expectations, constructed from the contingency table
of qualitative responses and the polychoric correlation matrix.6 In contrast we seek both
descriptively and econometrically to determine whether factors like age are associated
with an increased propensity to form rational expectations.
3 Latent Variable Testing of the Reliability of Ex-
pectations
In common with others (e.g. see Ivaldi (1992), Horvath et al. (1992) and Nerlove &
Schuermann (1995)) we assume that individuals’ survey responses are determined by an
individual-speciﬁc unobserved continuous random variable as it crosses thresholds.
Consider a survey that asks a sample of Nt individuals at year t both a retrospective
question, namely whether their ﬁnancial circumstances, for example, have improved, not
changed or worsened over the past year and a prospective question, namely whether they
expect their ﬁnancial circumstances to improve, not change or worsen over the next year.
Let yit denote the latent variable characterising the actual ﬁnancial situation of indi-
vidual i at time t, yit, {i = 1,2,...,Nt;t = 1,...,T}. At the end of period (t−1) individual
i makes a prediction, y∗
it, of yit based on information available to it, the information set
Ωi,t−1.
y
∗
it = E{yit|Ωi,t−1}. (1)
The retrospective and prospective survey data provide two pieces of categorical infor-
mation on the individual-speciﬁc random variable yit:
6Ivaldi (1992) applies a related methodology to Finnish data.
61. a prediction of yit made at the end of period (t − 1). The prediction is denoted by
the discrete random variable y
p
it,j, j = 1,2,3 (corresponding to “improve”, u∗, “stay
the same”, s∗, and “worsen”, d∗, respectively), where
y
p
it,j = 1 if aj−1,it < y
∗
it ≤ aj,it;0 otherwise
2. the actual outcome in period t. The outcome is denoted by the discrete random
variable yr
it,j, j = 1,2,3, or u, s and d, where
y
r
it,j = 1 if bj−1,it < yit ≤ bj,it ; 0 otherwise (2)
We follow convention and assume {a0,it,b0,it} = −∞ and {a3,it,b3,it} = ∞.
4 Descriptive Statistics on Expectations and their
Reliability
The probability distribution characterising y
p
it,j and yr
it,j is summarised by a 3 × 3 con-
tingency table. Table 1 lists these tables separately for each wave in the BHPS, while
Figure 1 draws out speciﬁc information contained in the contingency tables. U, S and D
denote the proportion of individuals who reply u, s and d, with asterisks referring to the
expectational question.
4.1 People are perennially too optimistic
Table 1 and Figure 1 reveal that more individuals realised a worsening in their ﬁnancial
circumstances than expected it. People, on average, appear to have been too optimistic.
Alternatively they may have got their forecasts right but, which seems unlikely across
11 years, have been subject to a series of negative shocks unforeseen at the time they
formed their expectations. However, there is an asymmetry since in contrast to when
they are pessimistic individuals’ optimism appears to be borne out, in the sense that a
similar proportion of individuals reported an improvement in their ﬁnancial circumstances
to expected it.7 This raises the possibility that positive and negative economic shocks are
7Interestingly, as Michael Bryan kindly pointed out to us, a similar picture emerges for the US when
studying the Michigan survey and comparing responses to the perceptions and expectations of “ﬁnancial
condition” question. Summarising, US individuals also appear to have been overly optimistic since while
7asymmetric; the results are consistent with the view that good luck is more predictable
than bad luck
Table 1: Contingency Tables of Realisations and Expectations from the BHPS
P(u|u∗) P(s|u∗) P(d|u∗) P(u|s∗) P(s|s∗) P(d|s∗) P(u|d∗) P(s|d∗) P(d|d∗)
1993 0.105 0.071 0.053 0.106 0.300 0.148 0.029 0.069 0.120
1994 0.115 0.079 0.056 0.107 0.286 0.149 0.024 0.069 0.115
1995 0.122 0.079 0.059 0.114 0.322 0.141 0.021 0.055 0.087
1996 0.139 0.087 0.052 0.128 0.343 0.115 0.021 0.045 0.069
1997 0.154 0.083 0.050 0.136 0.351 0.112 0.019 0.040 0.056
1998 0.147 0.086 0.058 0.136 0.358 0.116 0.016 0.032 0.050
1999 0.149 0.100 0.050 0.123 0.371 0.112 0.015 0.031 0.049
2000 0.150 0.090 0.055 0.129 0.370 0.114 0.016 0.030 0.047
2001 0.144 0.098 0.049 0.139 0.383 0.102 0.016 0.030 0.040
2002 0.133 0.092 0.050 0.132 0.394 0.112 0.014 0.030 0.043
2003 0.119 0.095 0.041 0.120 0.440 0.106 0.010 0.026 0.043
Notes: P(.|.∗) denotes the proportion of individuals in the BHPS who reported an improvement (u),
no change (s) or worsening (d) in their ﬁnancial circumstances, conditional on having expected an
improvement (u∗), no change (s∗) or worsening (d∗).
As we should expect if individuals form expectations rationally the top panel in Figure
1 also shows greater dispersion in realisations than expectations.8 A striking aspect is the
number of individuals who expect no change in their ﬁnancial circumstances. This is
consistent with Nerlove (1983) who in a study of ﬁrm-level output growth comments
on the fact that prospective output growth is much more concentrated on “no change”
than are reports about what has (retrospectively) happened to output. This is obviously
consistent with a situation where substantial deviations from the initial expectation are
the result of shocks which were not forecast.
The middle panel of Figure 1 plots the probability of an expectational error, estimated
as the proportion of non-diagonal elements on the contingency table. The probability of
an error declines slightly over the sample-period. This is consistent with macroeconomic
evidence that suggests volatility (in GDP growth or the business cycle) has declined over
the last 15 years; e.g. see Sensier & van Dijk (2004). Consistent with the evidence
the proportion of individuals who were optimists is similar for perceptions and expectations, a higher
proportion of individuals perceived a worsening in their ﬁnancial expectation than expected it.
8This is a common ﬁnding with qualitative data on realisations and expectations; e.g. for an applica-
tion to Holland see Das & van Soest (1999).
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Figure 1: The proportion of optimists and pessimists in the BHPS
in the top panel of Figure 1, suggesting that people are too optimistic when looking
ahead, the middle panel in Figure 1 conﬁrms that more individuals over-estimate (i.e. the
reported realisation turns out lower than expected) than under-estimate (i.e. the reported
realisation turns out more than expected).
It can also be observed from Table 1 that we cannot reject the Gourieroux & Pradel
(1986) [GP] nonparametric test for rationality. Under GP, rationality is satisﬁed if and
only if pkk ≥ max
j6=k
pjk; k = 1,...,K,, where pjk denotes the probability of observing realisa-
tion j and expectation k. But this test is valid only under the assumption that individuals’
ex ante and ex post probability density functions characterising behaviour are equivalent.
This implies that no macroeconomic shocks hit the economy after the expectation is
formed, but before the realisation is stated.
94.2 The accuracy of individual-level expectations
To indicate quantitatively, at the micro-level, the accuracy of individuals’ qualitative
forecasts of their ﬁnancial situation we estimate by maximum likelihood the polychoric
correlation between their expectations and the subsequent realisation which they report.9
Assuming yit and y∗
it follow a standardised bivariate normal distribution the polychoric
correlation between the variables is deﬁned as the oﬀ-diagonal element from their covari-
ance (correlation) matrix; see Olsson (1979). Our panel data set allows us to compute
the polychoric correlation across time (t = 1,...,T) and separately across individuals
(i = 1,...,N). Expressed alternatively, the contingency table can be constructed both
across i and t. This proves important in detecting heterogeneity between individuals and
over time.
Figure 2 plots the polychoric correlation between expectations and realisations, along
with the associated 95% conﬁdence intervals, across time. Realisations and expectations
are positively correlated and in a statistically signiﬁcant manner. However, there is some
volatility across time in the strength of their relationship, with a tendency towards de-
creased correlation.
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Figure 2: Financial Circumstances in the BHPS: Polychoric Correlation Between Reali-
sations and Expectations and the associated 95% conﬁdence interval
9While the Pearson (product moment) correlation coeﬃcient can be computed for polychotomous
observations, it is known to be misleading; see Mislevy (1986).
10To begin to establish whether certain types of individual are more likely to form accu-
rate expectations than others we estimate the polychoric correlation between expectations
and realisations for men and women separately, for those of diﬀerent ages, for those with
A-level qualiﬁcations or above and for those who are employed (either as an employee
or self-employed). We consider this issue more systematically in section 8 when regime
switching bivariate probit models are estimated which both let us identify what propor-
tion of the sample are rational and study whether there are any systematic patterns in
terms of who is rational.
Table 2 lists the polychoric correlation between realisations and expectations for these
sub-groups. The most striking ﬁnding is that older people appear to form more accurate
expectations ex post, in that the estimated correlation coeﬃcient rises with age. This
is consistent with the view that older people forecast better as their incomes are easier
to predict; their incomes are subject to less unpredictable noise (lower variance). Below
in Section 8 we examine whether this increased correlation translates into an increased
tendency to be rational in old age. Table 2 also shows some evidence to support the view
that those educated to A-level or above form more accurate expectations ex post.
5 Bivariate Probit Modelling Framework
To examine formally the reliability of households’ expectations and determine what factors
inﬂuence their reliability we consider a bivariate model which allows expectations and
realisations to be determined simultaneously:
yit = α + βzit−1 + zt + εit (3)
y
∗
it = α
∗ + β
∗zit−1 + z
∗
t + ε
∗
it (4)
where the disturbances εit and ε∗
it follow a bivariate normal distribution:
"
εit
ε∗
it
#
∼ i.i.d.N
 "
0
0
#
,
"
σ2
ε ρ
ρ σ2
ε∗
#!
, (5)
and zit−1 is realised income growth in year (t−1), relative to year (t−2), for individual i’s
household as reported quantitatively (objectively) in the BHPS. The household income
data are in real terms and adjusted for changes in household size using equivalence scales
following Bardasi & Jenkins (2004). zit−1 is assumed to be in an individual’s information
11Table 2: Polychoric correlations between individual-level realisations and expectations for
selected groupings
Polychoric corr. NT
Total All individuals 0.353
(0.004)
96665
Age <20 0.279
(0.016)
5978
20-30 0.289
(0.009)
17807
30-40 0.283
(0.008)
22273
40-50 0.303
(0.009)
19358
50-60 0.347
(0.011)
15752
60> 0.408
(0.010)
23583
Sex Female 0.343
(0.006)
52641
Male 0.363
(0.006)
44024
Educ O-levels or below 0.346
(0.006)
51695
A-levels or above 0.349
(0.006)
43912
Job Status Employed 0.330
(0.005)
57074
Other 0.349
(0.067)
39566
Notes: Estimation using the BHPS from 1991 to 2003.
Estimated standard errors in parentheses
set when she forms her expectations. zt are time dummies designed to capture macroeco-
nomic shocks observed after individuals form their expectations but before they reply to
the realisation question, such that z∗
t = E(zt| Ωt−1). (zt−z∗
t) can therefore be interpreted
as a macroeconomic shock. Use of dummies is, in a sense, convenient as it obviates the
need to identify and estimate the macroeconomic shocks per se. Below we compare the
estimated dummies with a time-series of macroeconomic shocks computed as deviations
of GDP growth from forecasts published in real-time by HM Treasury.
Equations (3)-(4) accommodate measurement error in the underlying continuous ran-
dom variables yit and y∗
it by treating them as dependent variables. This does, however, as-
sume the measurement error is uncorrelated with the explanatory variables; see Bertrand
12& Mullainathan (2001). Crucially (3)-(4) allows expectations y∗
it to be endogenous essen-
tially tackling simultaneity bias in a similar manner to a vector autoregression by assigning
any contemporaneous dependence ρ to the disturbance terms. In contrast previous work
such as Horvath et al. (1992) has assumed expectations are exogenous; this is inconsistent
with the plausible view that common factors inﬂuence both expectations and realisations.
To account for the ordinal nature of the available data y
p
it,j and yr
it,j, (3)-(4) is esti-
mated as an ordered bivariate probit panel-data model. We consider a pooled model; but
importantly parameter estimates remain consistent with the inclusion of random eﬀects
and their standard errors are consistent when a corrected covariance matrix is used; see
Guilkey & Murphy (1993).10 In fact, the homogeneity restrictions (across i) imposed on
the coeﬃcients in (3)-(4) are driven by the properties of the BHPS data. Since T is small,
ranging from 1 to 11 across individuals, (3)-(4) cannot be estimated separately for each
individual. But to draw out heterogeneity below the model is estimated separately for
men and women. In addition, in section 8 we let individuals switch between a rational
and irrational state according to a wider set of background characteristics.
Equations (3)-(4) can be seen to generalise Souleles (2004) whose model amalgamates
(3)-(4) into a single equation explaining the forecast error (yit − y∗
it). A related approach
is adopted by Das & van Soest (1997) and Das & van Soest (1999) when examining Dutch
households. Given the available data (i.e. y
p
it,j and yr
it,j) ordered probit estimation, with
ﬁve categories of error, can then proceed only on the assumption that errors are cardinal;
i.e. two places oﬀ the diagonal on the contingency table is twice as bad as being one place
oﬀ. Additionally use of a single equation does not let one draw out the diﬀerential aﬀect
of information on expectations and realisations.
As well as identifying those factors which determine consumers’ expectations and
making comparisons with the realisations, as we now explain a test for whether consumers
make eﬃcient use of available information when forming their forecasts or expectations
of the future can be formulated using (3)-(4).
10In fact experimentation in both Gauss and in gllamm (see Skrondal & Rabe-Hesketh (2004)) could not
overcome the computational burden associated with the estimation of bivariate ordered random eﬀects
models, with a large sample.
136 Testing rationality
Under rationality and quadratic loss
E(yit − y
∗
it|Ωit−1) = 0. (6)
This also implies that the expectational errors have zero means and are serially uncor-
related. To test this hypothesis in a meaningful manner attention must be paid to how
equations (3)-(4) are identiﬁed.
Conditioning εit on ε∗
it we can write
εit = (ρ/σ
2
ε∗)ε
∗
it + ηit (7)
where ηit is an i.i.d. error such that E(ηitε∗
it) = 0. To ensure Var(yit) ≥ Var(y∗
it), which
must hold under rationality, for identiﬁcation we assume σ2
ε = 1 but let σ2
ε∗ ≤ σ2
ε be
freely estimated. Identiﬁcation is then achieved by assuming common thresholds for the
expectations and realisations: ajt = bjt = aj (j = 1,2). In other words, consumers are
assumed to use the same “yardstick” when evaluating ex ante and ex post movements in
their ﬁnancial circumstances.11 Similarly Horvath et al. (1992), in contradistinction to
Ivaldi (1992), impose this restriction to identify a regression relationship between yit and
y∗
it. This diﬀers from polychoric (LISREL) correlation when for identiﬁcation it is assumed
instead that σ2
ε = σ2
ε∗ = 1. As discussed, this restriction is inappropriate when testing
rationality; it is therefore preferable to assume common thresholds instead. Conveniently
we also bypass any complications [see Cudeck (1989)] that may arise from inferring a
structural model from correlation rather than covariance matrices, complications ignored
by Horvath et al. (1992), Ivaldi (1992) and Nerlove & Schuermann (1995). Var(yit) ≥
Var(y∗
it) explains our empirical ﬁnding that there is a concentration of expectations in the
no change category (see Figure 1). Identiﬁcation is completed by assuming, as is usual in
discrete choice models since no threshold parameters are set to zero, α = α∗ = 0.
We can clearly identify the restrictions which rationality, see (6), imposes on equations
(3)-(4) by considering the conditional linear model12
yit = (α − ρα
∗) + (β − ρβ
∗)zit−1 + (zt − ρz
∗
t) + ρy
∗
it + ηit (8)
11This restriction has been employed elsewhere; e.g. see Wren-Lewis (1986).
12Our use of the joint density is also motivated by the fact that eﬃciency is lost in estimation if the
conditional rather than joint distribution is considered even when E(y∗
itηit) = 0; see Ronning & Kukuk
(1996).
14which implies that the expectational error is determined by the following process
(yit − y
∗
it) = (α − ρα
∗) + (β − ρβ
∗)zit−1 + (zt − ρz
∗
t) + (ρ − 1)y
∗
it + ηit (9)
which is familiar to us as the standard (Mincer-Zarnowitz) framework to test rationality.
It is of methodological interest that when testing rationality Brown & Taylor (2006)
arrive at a reduced-form equation similar to (8). In their ﬁrst speciﬁcation Brown and
Taylor assume expectations are exogenous. In addition they do not account appropriately
for the categorical nature of the expectational data from the BHPS since they appear
simply to explain realisations with respect to expectations considered in the form of an
index like y
p
it,j. Clearly one can always re-scale y
p
it,j to ensure ρ = 1, their hypothesis
of interest. Secondly, Brown and Taylor allow y∗
it to be endogenous; at a ﬁrst-step ex-
pectations are modelled and at a second step (8) is estimated using predicted values for
y∗
it. Our approach has the advantage of being one-step and does not suﬀer from use of
generated variables which, as Brown & Taylor (2006) explain, is likely to induce bias. In
addition we make clear the identiﬁcation restrictions employed.
Therefore for rationality the following three restrictions need to hold:
1. α = α∗
2. β = β
∗
3. ρ = 1
These restrictions ensure orthogonality of yit−y∗
it with respect to Ωit−1. Decomposing
Ωit−1 into sub-components is helpful in letting us determine with respect to what each
restriction imposes orthogonality. We can see that (i) E((yit −y∗
it|y∗
it) = 0 when (ρ−1) =
0 ⇒ ρ = 1; (ii) E((yit − y∗
it)|zit−1) = 0 when β = ρβ
∗; (iii) E((yit − y∗
it)|1) = 0, which is
unbiasedness, when α = ρα∗. Therefore E((yit−y∗
it)Ωit−1) = 0 requires ρ = 1, β = β
∗ and
α = α∗. A Wald test can therefore be constructed to test (6). The test for rationality, as
indicated, is a joint test of the identifying restrictions and these three testable assumptions
implied by rationality.
Under rationality micro-level expectational errors are explicable only with respect to
macroeconomic shocks
yit − y
∗
it = (zt − z
∗
t) + ηit. (10)
Therefore testing the three restrictions, in eﬀect, is an application of the conventional
orthogonality test (of zit−1) to the analysis of qualitative data. But from (10) we can see
15that rationality, even under the maintained assumption of quadratic loss, in the presence
of macroeconomic shocks need not imply expectations are unbiased ex post. In addition
given the categorical nature of the expectational data and the ensuing use of discrete choice
models, rather than the classical linear regression, even if the macroeconomic eﬀects are
assumed orthogonal to the other explanatory variables we should not expect the parameter
estimates in (9) to be consistent when they are omitted; for related discussion for single
equation discrete choice models see Wooldridge (2002) [p. 470].
7 Estimation Results
Equations (3)-(4) are estimated separately for men and women.13 This sample split was
motivated by the practical desire to speed up estimation of what, with a large sample, is
quite an involved model. It will also establish whether heterogeneity is present, although it
is unclear what economic theory would suggest gender helps determine rationality. Table
3 reports the results while Figure 3 plots the estimated dummy variables, which were all
highly signiﬁcant statistically.
Table 3: Explaining realisations and expectations using a bivariate ordered probit model
Female Male
a1 = b1: lower threshold −0.789
(−147.79)
−0.769
(−129.13)
a2 = b2: upper threshold 0.606
(125.27)
0.480
(99.70)
β : coeﬀ on income in realis eqn 0.010
(2.77)
0.018
(4.46)
β
∗ : coeﬀ on income in expec eqn 0.014
(5.08)
0.017
(5.31)
ρ 0.337
(60.10)
0.357
(57.55)
σ2
ε∗ 0.732
(47.79)
0.749
(37.71)
NT 52641 44024
N 10434 8847
LogL -97988 -85760
H0 : REH (p-value) 0.000 0.000
H0 : β = β
∗ (p-value) 0.122 0.330
Notes: Estimation using the BHPS from 1991 to 2003. Estimated t-
values in parentheses.
13Those individuals still at school are dropped from the panel.
16From Table 3 we can see that there are no clear diﬀerences between men and women,
beyond slight evidence that men react more strongly to realised changes in their lagged
income. Across men and women we can draw out several common ﬁndings.
Consistent with rationality individuals appear to react similarly to observed income
changes both when forming expectations and when reporting their realisations. As we
might expect, a rise in lagged objective income is associated with increased conﬁdence and
higher reported subjective income. This is consistent with evidence for other countries.
For example, using the Dutch Socio-economic Panel, Alessie & Lusardi (1997) and Das &
van Soest (1999) ﬁnd that expectations are positively aﬀected by realised income changes
in the past. This conﬁrms the impression that individuals have in mind their own income
growth, at least among other things, when replying to subjective expectational questions.
A positive and statistically signiﬁcant correlation, ρ, indicates that consistent with the
descriptive evidence in Figure 2 there is a positive and signiﬁcant relationship between
expectations and realisations. Comparison with Table 2 reveals little diﬀerence relative
to the unconditional polychoric correlation coeﬃcient; in Table 2 the correlation between
expectations and realisations, across all individuals, was estimated to be 0.353 which is
very similar to the values for b ρ seen in Table 3. But b ρ < 1 implies that this relationship
is not as close as rationality demands. In particular, it implies that while statistically
signiﬁcant macroeconomic shocks occurring after the forecast was made do not explain
all of the forecasting error. This suggests individuals’ expectations are not rational ex
ante, since they can be explained with reference to lagged income growth and that the
expectational error can be forecast in part with reference to expectations themselves.
Unsurprisingly rationality is therefore rejected via a Wald test, with p-values of 0.00.
Indeed the cause of the irrationality appears to be ρ < 1 rather than β
0
i 6= β
0∗
i , since one
cannot reject the hypothesis that β = β
∗.
Expectational errors therefore appear to have a systematic component that varies
across individuals. Since b ρb β
∗
i < b βi a fall (rise) in realised income means an individual
over (under) estimates her future income. Individuals whose income increased in the
last year tend to be too pessimistic when forecasting the future. Conversely individuals
whose incomes decreased in the last year tend to be too optimistic when forming their
expectations. This is consistent with the view that expectations are too smooth and under
rationality should react more strongly to observed income changes. This kind of regressive
expectation might be explained by the value function in the prospect theory of Kahneman
& Tversky (1979) which implies that the risk attitude of individuals will depend on
whether they are in a win or a loss situation relative to their reference point. Individuals
17become risk lovers (and perhaps optimistic) in loss situations (when their realised income
declined last year) and risk averse (and perhaps pessimistic) in win situations (when their
realised income increased last year).
Figure 3 plots the estimated time dummies for the realisation and expectational equa-
tions. These time dummies are statistically signiﬁcant implying that there is a relationship
between micro and macro forecasting errors. This, of course, constitutes no violation of
rationality ex ante. The top panel indicates that the expectations dummies are smoother,
with the realisation dummies exhibiting a little more volatility. This smoothness casts
doubt on the value of expectational data for short term forecasting since it suggests they
are unable to pick up short term ﬂuctuations.
The remaining panels of Figure 3 plot the macroeconomic shock, identiﬁed as the
diﬀerence between zt and z∗
t, alongside a time-series of ‘known’ macroeconomic shocks.
These are computed as deviations of actual GDP growth from consensus forecasts pub-
lished in real-time by HM Treasury.14 Inspecting the diﬀerence between the dummy
variables, which we interpret as a shock, we see that people are continually subject to
negative shocks. This helps to explain the excessive optimism which, we found above,
individuals have when forming expectations. Across households ﬁnancial circumstances
routinely turn out worse than expected. Figure 3 also shows that the bias in individu-
als’ expectations varies over time and appears to follow a cyclical pattern. Nevertheless,
accounting for macroeconomic shocks does not explain individuals’ irrationality.
Relating these shocks with the HMT shock we can identify whether individuals col-
lectively react to something we can agree was a genuine shock or whether they were
collectively deluded and reacted to perceived rather than realised macroeconomic shocks.
The greatest negative shocks occur at times when the macroeconomy exceeded HMT’s
expectations. Indeed the micro and macro shocks are correlated −0.45, implying that
the shocks that aﬀect individuals are diﬀerent from those that aﬀect forecasters at HM
Treasury.
8 Rational versus Irrational States: a regime-switching
bivariate probit model
To determine statistically those individuals, and those types of people, for whom the net
beneﬁt of forming rational expectations is apparently positive we extend the bivariate
14We consider HMT forecasts made in December for the (calendar) year ahead.
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Figure 3: Macroeconomic Shocks: Relating the macroeconomic shocks for men and women
from the BHPS to known macroeconomic shocks based on HM Treasury forecasts of GDP
growth
ordered probit model, (3)-(4), to categorize individuals as rational or irrational in each
year. Consistent with the fact that the net beneﬁt of forming rational expectations can
vary for a given individual over time, each individual can switch between ‘rationality’
and ‘irrationality’ over time. Individuals can then be classiﬁed into one of these two
categories, if signiﬁcant statistically, according to which one is more likely. The function
that determines the probability of a switch could be interpreted as the reduced-form of
the cost-beneﬁt function. Individuals who form rational expectations could be presumed
to have concluded that the net beneﬁt of forming rational expectations is positive.
The two categories are distinguished from each other by allowing the individual to
switch between (3)-(4), with the rationality restrictions imposed, and a freely estimated
version of (3)-(4). The latter could be seen as the reduced-form of various models of irra-
tional behaviour. We let individuals switch according to an unobserved random variable
19{sit}, where sit = 1 when individual i at time t is in state 1 (rationality) and sit = 2
when they are in state 2 (irrationality).15 Let P(sit = l;θ) = pj (l = 1,2), where θ is
a vector of parameters, denote the probability that individual i at time t is in state 1
or 2. Speciﬁcally we use a probit model to establish the probability in each year that
an individual is rational or irrational, with the probability depending on a function of
individual-level characteristics such as age, job market status, education, whether the
level of their income is above the median level and income growth. These were factors
identiﬁed in Table 2 as of importance in explaining expectational errors. Eﬀectively we
let P(sit = j;θ) = Φ(−βxit−1) where Φ is the cdf of the normal distribution and xit−1 is
a vector of explanatory variables which include income growth zit−1.
The regime-switching bivariate ordered probit model is estimated by maximum-likelihood.
The joint unconditional probability of {yit,y∗
it}, f(yit,y∗
it;θ), is the weighted sum of the
two bivariate conditional densities f(yit,y∗
it|sit = l;θ), with the weights equal to p1 and
(1 − p1).
Conditional on estimates for θ
P(sit = l|yit,y
∗
it,θ) =
pjf(yit,y∗
it|sit = l;θ)
f(yit,y∗
it;θ)
. (11)
(11) can then be used to calculate for each individual {yit,y∗
it} the probability that
they are from each state. When P(sit = l|yit,y∗
it,θ) > 0.5 we classify individual i at time
t as being in state l.
8.1 Switching results
Table 4 presents the results of the switching model. These are designed to help us un-
derstand statistically what if any factors contribute to behaviour more consistent with
rationality. The estimated dummy variables are not reported but are very similar, in
both states, to those presented in Figure 3.
Table 4 shows clearly that for both men and women age is highly statistically sig-
niﬁcant in the probability/switching equation. This suggests that the old might be more
likely to ﬁnd the net beneﬁt of forming rational expectations to be positive. Accordingly
they form expectations according to the rational expectations hypothesis. The less edu-
cated, whether male or female, are also more likely to form rational expectations. This
is consistent with the view that the highly educated, because of their better prospects,
15For related discussion and references see Garcia et al. (1997). Similarly they used a switching regres-
sion to classify individuals as liquidity constrained.
20have higher (opportunity) costs to forming rational expectations and/or derive less beneﬁt
from their formation, perhaps because they ﬁnd it easier to correct expectational mistakes
although we do not explore this formally. Interestingly although testing rationality via its
implications for consumption behaviour, Benito & Mumtaz (2006) using the BHPS also
ﬁnd that the probability of excess sensitivity (irrationality) is higher for the young and
those with a degree. Table 4 also shows that women with a job are less likely to form
rational expectations, but men albeit not in a statistically signiﬁcant manner are more
likely. An individual’s income, whether measured as growth over the last year or via a
dummy variable equal to unity if higher than the median income level, appears to matter
only for women, with the richer more likely to form rational expectations. We have no
explanation for the diﬀerences between men and women. But we might imagine that the
poor are less aﬀected by their expectations, and hence have less incentive to form them ra-
tionally, since state beneﬁts limit downside risk and on the upside credit constraints mean
they cannot act upon their optimism. In any case, Table 4 shows that the incentives to
form rational expectations vary across individuals according to their situation.16
While rationality was rejected for the sample as a whole in Table 3, from the results
of the switching model presented in Table 4 we can compute the proportion of individuals
who, in fact, form expectations consistent with rationality. Using (11) we calculate over
the sample as a whole the proportion of individuals whose predicted probability of being
in the rational state exceeds 0.5. This is taken as a measure of the proportion of the sample
who are rational. For men we ﬁnd that 40% are rational, and for women 42%. Similarly
the mean probability of being rational is 0.38 and 0.36, for men and women, respectively.
These estimates again can be related to those of Benito & Mumtaz (2006), who also using
the BHPS, estimated that 20%-40% of UK households display excess sensitivity with the
remaining larger group smoothing their consumption to the degree predicted by the joint
implications of rationality and the permanent income hypothesis.
9 Concluding Comments
This paper complements the US-based work of Souleles (2004) by modelling and then
testing the rationality of individual-level expectational data in Britain. In so doing it
provides useful insight into the validity of standard economic assumptions about expec-
tations formation. In addition, when expectational data are qualitative, as they are in
16Relatedly, in the context of forecasting inﬂation, Bryan & Palmqvist (2005) use survey data to test
whether the incentive to form rational expectations increases with the level of inﬂation.
21the application to the BHPS, it suggests the use of bivariate ordered probit models, ap-
propriately identiﬁed, as a vehicle both to understand expectation formation and to test
rationality in the presence of macroeconomic shocks.
It is found that the British are more optimistic/pessimistic about the future when
they have recently seen their households’ income growth rise/fall. But since lagged move-
ments in their income growth can also help explain individuals’ expectational errors, we
reject the hypothesis that they form their expectations rationally. But when forming their
expectations individuals do appear to react to lagged movements in their household’s in-
come consistent with rationality, suggesting a systematic and purposeful component to
expectations. However, the correlation between expectations and realisations, even after
controlling for macroeconomic shocks, is weak and we ﬁnd that expectations are exces-
sively smooth and appear regressive. We suggest that this might be explained by prospect
theory (cf. Kahneman & Tversky (1979)), whereby individuals become risk lovers (opti-
mistic) in loss situations (when their realised income declined last year) and risk averse
(pessimistic) in win situations (when their realised income increased last year). Under
rationality individuals should react more strongly to observed income changes. We also
ﬁnd that individuals appear to be overly optimistic about their ﬁnancial circumstances.
This is consistent with the view that good luck is more predictable than bad luck.
A regime-switching model is then estimated to determine statistically the types of
people who are more likely than not to form rational expectations. We ﬁnd that around
40% of individuals form expectations consistent with rationality. We also ﬁnd that the
probabilities are diﬀerent for diﬀerent types of people. In particular, we ﬁnd that the
propensity to form rational expectations increases with experience (i.e. age) rather than
education. The young and highly educated are presumed to have concluded that the net
beneﬁts of forming rational expectations are negative. In future work we aim to build on
these stylised facts and distinguish statistically between alternative models of irrational
behaviour.
22Table 4: The probability of an individual using some alternative model to rationality to
form their expectations. Rational versus irrational states: a regime switching approach
Female Male
Irrationality Rationality Irrationality Rationality
a1 = b1: lower threshold −0.742
(−75.250)
−0.646
(−65.259)
−0.806
(−80.905)
−0.415
(−58.006)
a2 = b2: upper threshold 0.242
(24.085)
0.837
(80.519)
0.129
(12.965)
0.781
(78.114)
β : coeﬀ on income in realis eqn 0.003
(0.292)
0.011
(0.995)
0.025
(2.509)
0.001
(0.066)
β
∗ : coeﬀ on income in expec eqn 0.010
(1.794)
− 0.025
(2.480)
−
ρ 0.455
(21.630)
1 0.434
(19.588)
1
σ2
ε∗ 0.769
(25.107)
0.399
(91.800)
0.821
(19.709)
0.744
(29.60)
Switching coeﬃcients
age/100 3.778
(377.79)
4.243
(423.602)
education −0.269
(−26.372)
−0.236
(−23.551)
job status −0.110
(−10.399)
0.015
(1.579)
median income 0.056
(5.513)
−0.002
(−0.225)
income growth (zit−1) −0.008
(−0.845)
0.002
(1.528)
constant −1.832
(−183.209)
−2.204
(−220.432)
NT 52641 44024
N 10434 8847
LogL -93129 -81294
Notes: Estimation using the BHPS from 1991 to 2003. Estimated t-
values in parentheses. Education is a dummy variable equal to unity
when educated to A-level or above. Similarly job status equals unity for
an individual with a job and zero otherwise. Median income equals unity
for those individuals whose household’s income is above the median level
and zero otherwise.
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